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Explanation, interpretation, and understanding usually go together in the sense that both explanation and interpretation yield understanding. Contrary to some thinking, I believe that what characterizes a pragmatic view on explanation and interpretation is that a pragmatic approach first and foremost focuses on the functional role of explanation and interpretation in terms of providing understanding. I therefore believe that the notion of understanding should be characterized independently of the notions of explanation and interpretation. Understanding has something to do with the connectedness between the information we receive by the explanation or by the interpretation and our background knowledge, assumptions, and beliefs.
Because explanation and interpretation are context-dependent both with respect to standards and cognitive interests, the understanding they produce will be contextual, too.​[1]​ A pragmatic view on the relation between explanation, interpretation, and understanding is normative. It has to be because we want our explanations and interpretations, and thus our understanding, to be true, relevant, and successful. But a pragmatic theory of explanation and interpretation is not normative in the sense that it holds that an answer has to fulfil certain eternal standards to be considered an explanation or an interpretation – standards such as formal requirements à la Hempel or such as the answer being causally formulated or even being true (Faye 1999, 2007, and 2010). As long as an answer is a response to an explanation-seeking or an interpretative seeking-question and it provides the questioner (and others) with understanding, the answer functions as an explanation or an interpretation. For this reason I think we see all types of understanding in science such as those given by causal, nomic, structural, functional, intentional, conceptual, mathematical, and metaphysical explanations (and interpretations). In short, a pragmatic approach attempts to give a descriptive analysis of understanding rather than a prescriptive definition thereof. In this sense our grasp of understanding is not normative.


A brief characterisation of understanding
Scientists in general or a group of scientists – not different from other social groups – share particular norms of understanding which not only involve, say, predictions but also call upon the whole practice of science or the whole practise of the particular discipline in question, as Kuhn pointed out long time ago. To a certain extent such norms of intelligibility do change over time, but more importantly they may change from context to context. Lord Kelvin is well-known for having said that the litmus test for understanding a phenomenon is that we can make a mechanical model of it, a view that was in high fashion in 19th century science. Today no physicist would dare to make such a claim. Later pure mechanical representations were replaced by the requirement of visualization of a process in space and time. For instance, Bohr seems to have cherished some hopes up to around the mid 1920s to create a quantum mechanics which still would be able to trace quantum processes as a series of causal happenings in space and time, until 1925, when Heisenberg convinced him of abandoning any visualizable picture (Faye 1991, pp. 120 ff). But, in opposition to Bohr and the defenders of the so-called “Copenhagen Interpretation”, other physicists like Einstein and David Bohm persisted in denying that quantum mechanics gave us the appropriate insight into nature of the atom because of its violation of determinism and visualization.
In more recent time James Cushing has defended causal visualization as an important norm of intelligibility. He believed that there are three distinct goals which a scientific theory should meet. They are empirical adequacy, formal explanation, and understanding. Orthodox quantum mechanics may give us explanation in the sense of the deductive-nomological model of explanation but such an explanation “does not in itself give us understanding of the phenomena subsumed under the laws in question.” (Cushing 1994: 10, Se also Cushing 1991) Explanatory understanding we do have, says Cushing, if these explanations stand up to certain regulative principles, ideals of the natural order which go beyond the purely epistemic. Nonetheless, these principles “may be era dependent” (p. 11) One such regulative principle is the causal picture of local interaction: “a satisfying understanding may be possible for us only when we are able to tell a local, causal picture story of those processes. If this is so, then we are, by definition, doomed, according to the standard (Copenhagen) interpretation of quantum mechanics to be unable to understand quantum phenomena (and quantum mechanics).” (p. 20) Cushing argues that we do get this form of understanding with Bohm’s theory of the quantum potentials. He admits, however, that orthodox quantum mechanics and Bohm’s theory are empirically equivalent, and the only explanation he offers for the prevalence of quantum mechanics is that Heisenberg’s indeterministic theory was invented thirty years before Bohm’s deterministic theory.
These remarks deserve some comments. From what Cushing has argued we can see that there is no best explanation of quantum phenomenon; physicists may use two alternative theories which are both equally empirically adequate. That they frequently refer to standard quantum mechanics may be because of contextual reasons such as their training within a certain historical tradition. This education makes them pose their explanation-seeking question in terms of the orthodox theory. But one also needs to have in mind that no coherent extension of Bohm’s theory into the relativistic domain exists, whereas standard quantum mechanics can be given a relativistic formulation. Furthermore, where it only makes sense in the orthodox view to ascribe certain dynamical or kinematical properties to an atomic object in a certain experimental context, Bohm’s theory constructs a distinction between, say, the observed position, which is contextually dependent, and the real position which the particle has quite independently of any measurement. This is how Bohm’s theory becomes deterministic and gives us a causal picture. But there is also a heavy price to pay. For the price to pay for the acclaimed understanding is obtained by relying on a wealth of internal properties and structures which are postulated in whatever number is necessary to explain the outcomes of experiments in a classical fashion. The general weakness of Bohm’s theory in the eyes of many physicists is that the alleged understanding is purchased by a loss of any empirical access to those elements that give rise to a causal understanding. If we cannot prove a priori that determinism is a universal and indispensable principle, which Cushing did not claim, then the so-called understanding seems to be rather meagre when we take into consideration that we cannot show a posteriori that the principle is valid in the quantum world. Nonetheless, Cushing had a point which cannot be ignored. Scientists clearly prefer explanations that involve causal or deterministic descriptions. This bias in favour of determinism is due to the fact that these causal explanations tie the explanandum to the explanans more strongly than indeterministic explanations and, as we shall see in a moment, understanding consists in the coherence which the explanation creates in our belief system.  
The norms of empirical understanding are different from those of conceptual understanding, and those of physics almost certainly do deviate from those of literature. Moreover, some scientists believe that pragmatic virtues like mathematical rigor, simplicity, and consistency form the road to scientific understanding, whereas others believe that prediction and experiment are what gives them the grasp of nature. As we shall see, Einstein mentioned completeness, adaptability, and clearness on the one hand, and logical perfection and security of the foundations on the other.  But all this does not mean that it is impossible to give a general philosophical characterization of understanding which applies to all the different ways in which understanding might be gained.
I shall propose, according to what I have argued so far, a general definition of understanding by saying:

(U) A human agent A understands a phenomenon P in a certain context C in the terms of a theory T if and only if A’s beliefs regarding P connect (in the normatively correct way for A, i.e. in accordance to A’s norms N of understanding) with A’s background knowledge, beliefs, presuppositions, and epistemic standards and personal interests.

Among A’s beliefs and assumptions there are many which do not count as pieces of knowledge but which accord with A’s belief systems and interests. It means that A may rightly claim to understand P, and therefore to assume that a belief regarding P is true, but not know whether her belief is true.
The internalist conditions of understanding are at least four in number: the connection must be 1) consistent, 2) coherent, 3) relevant, and 4) sound. Indeed, if A’s belief regarding a particular P is inconsistent with whatever he believes, we would not say that he understands P. I believe in the existence of centaurs but I also believe in natural selection and what biology in general tells me about the evolution of species. Furthermore, I have no particular evidence of their existence.  How could I claim to have understanding of centaurs other than as a grasp of a fictitious creature as long as this contradicts all other things I believe? I can conceptually understand what a centaur is, and I can even picture one, but I cannot “explain” centaurs, since their existence does not fit into what else I believe.  However, since the non-existence of centaurs is a real state of affairs (I assume), then I can seek an explanatory understanding of that fact, presumably by showing that certain biological principles in which I do believe would rule out the possibility of a half man and half horse creature.  
This does not imply that there is no inconsistency and incoherence between our beliefs or clusters of beliefs. Many of our background beliefs are stored in different cognitive departments between which there is little or no explanatory or inferential connection, say between physical beliefs and political beliefs. This is due to the fact that we often maintain that these different belief systems are not relevant for each other. But also within each and every department there exists a certain amount of inconsistency. Sometimes we want to get rid of that in our constant battle to attain understanding, whereas at other times we may regard it as the inevitable result of different cognitive perspectives on the same empirical phenomenon.


Theoretical Unification and Understanding

Michael Friedman suggests that what it is about scientific explanation that provides us with understanding is the unification of general phenomena. We increase our scientific understanding of the world to the degree in which we can reduce the total number of independently acceptable assumptions that we need to explain the phenomena in nature (Friedmann 1974, p.15) A phenomenon is here to be understood not as an individual thing or event but as general regularity or pattern of behaviour that can be expressed by law-like state​ments (p. 5). In fact, Friedman denies that explanation of one singu​lar fact by reference to another fact is important in science. What is important is that empirical laws such as Kepler’s laws of planetary motion and Galileo’s law of the free fall can be derived from Newton’s fundamental law of gravitation and certain additions. In order for this to work, it is clear that Friedman needs to provide a method for counting the acceptable assumptions in any given explanation. The basic intuition to support such a measure is the notion of individually acceptable lawlike sentences which, roughly, are individually acceptable if there are sufficient grounds for accepting the one and if these grounds are not sufficient for accepting the others. Be that as it may, one significant side of the scienti​fic enter​prise seems to be the continuous effort to integrate such general phenomena into an overall explanatory schema. This idea is not so far from the received view in the sense that Hempel and Oppenheim already argued that higher-level laws with a broader scope had the power of ex​plaining lower-level laws with a narrower scope. The power comes from the deductive inference of the lower-level laws from the higher-level laws.​[2]​ But, in addition to that view, Friedman maintains that what gives us understanding is not expectation but the fact that a high-level law unites different low-level laws which at one time were considered to be mutually independent. 
Friedman’s proposed account of understanding leads us to ask: what precisely is it about unification which gives us explanation and hence furnishes us with scientific understanding? Here Friedman is rather vague. As we have already argued, it cannot be because unification embeds the general phenomenon in a causal pattern. I shall therefore submit that the kind of understanding in question has something to do with the amount of theoreti​cal integra​tion. Looking around we find some hints pointing in that direction at both Mill’s and Ramsay’s notion of laws. While attempting to characterize laws of nature as statements, they point to a system of sentences expressing the fewest and most simple assump​tions from which any regularity in the world might deductively be derived. But there are innumera​bly many theories that cover the phenomena. In his book Counterfactuals, David Lewis improves the idea by maintaining that laws are sentences which describe all those regulari​ties common to true systems of deductively closed sentences (theories) that achieve the best balance between simplicity and strength (Lewis 1973 pp. 72-77; (1986) pp. xi-xvi). These two features often oppose one another. A theory may have strength, or a high amount of information content, at the expense of simplicity or vice versa. Therefore Lewis demands a fair balance between strength and simplicity. But what one considers as a “fair” balance seems to depend on pragmatic considerations.
Obviously, Mill, Ramsay, and Lewis regarded laws of nature as sentences and not as natural relations among phenomena. I advocate a similar position while saying that some laws are nothing but sentences about the explicit use of a language, namely those which are called principles or theoretical laws; whereas I depart from this view when I argue that other laws are generaliza​tions about causes among phenomena. So perhaps we can exploit their ideas to say something about theoreti​cal unifica​tion? But before we examine the question, we must address a certain point in van Fraassen’s disapproval of Lewis’ analysis of laws (van Fraassen 1989, Ch. 3).
First, van Fraassen grants that this account solves the problem of inference because according to its definition of a law it is the case that if it is a law that A, then A. He thinks, however, that the account has problems with the identification of laws. He points out, correctly I think, that the notions of strength and simplicity are not straightfor​ward criteria, neither in relation to one another as they may diverge between different deductive systems, nor in relation to the historical development and the actual pursuit of science. (Indeed, one also has the same problem with respect to “fair”.) The conclusion he draws is that Lewis’ sense of laws is not one in which laws are guaranteed explana​tory powers, because strength and simplicity are not translation invariant. The only way to escape this objection would be to argue that laws have to be formulated in a correct language which reflects the existence of natural classes. But such anti-nominalism is a no way out, according to van Fraassen. Because actual science seems to move away from the idea of real distinc​tions in nature, and because we can easily imagine a scientist creating a new theory which is more informative than its alternatives but whose theoretical terms are not definable in terms of the old theory and therefore do not stand for natural classes.
Of course, the persua​sive​ness of the objection depends on one’s understanding of informa​tion and explanatory power. In a certain way I believe that van Fraassen is right, although I don’t feel convinced by his argument. First, assume it is possible to create a complete new language which cannot be defined in terms of the old one. If so, then one of the premises in van Fraassen's objection against Lewis’ account collapses, namely that strength and simplicity are not translation invariant. For if no transla​tion is possible, it is absurd to complain that strength and simplicity are not invariant under translation. On the other hand, assume, it is possible to make a translation, then one could argue that those new terms which can be seen as a translation of old ones would stand for natural classes. Secondly, one can always argue that the practice of science requires that some fundamental concepts are carried over into the new theory because such a practice is merely a general extension of our everyday understand​ing. I think van Fraassen is aiming at something of importance when he draws our attention to the fact that theoretical terms need not refer to a real type of phenomena in the world. But the question of reference or no reference is a question about the difference between a situation in which these terms can occur in the causal language of observation and experimentation, and one in which they occur only in the formulation of theoretical laws. Nevertheless, the unsettled issue is how theoretical laws can carry information or have explanatory power, if they don’t refer to a certain objective fact of nature.
Let us pursue this issue by distin​guishing between two modes of unifica​tion. One concerns the integration of princi​ples and the other the integra​tion of concepts, both having a dimension of generali​ty and a dimension of parsimony. It is, for in​stance, clear that we may achieve a gain in the generality of principles by adding higher order principles to our theoretical system without having a reduction in the number of lower order principles. The gain in generality corresponds to a loss of parsimony. And the same holds for concepts too. We shall therefore say that a theoreti​cal system has the power of “principle integration” if it reduces the number of low-level principles concerning different domains to a few high order princi​ples in which the various domains unify into one domain. Similarly, we shall claim that such a system has the power of “conceptual integration” if it is able to systematize our knowledge of the phenomena in a manner allowing for fewer kinds of basic entities and properties than previous theoretical systems. Usually the systematization is done by seeking out a multitude of different concepts with a very narrow scope and replacing them with fewer concepts with a much broader scope. However, conceptu​al integra​tion does not necessar​ily imply integration of princi​ples, although the implica​tion seems to hold the other way around. For instance, the introduc​tion of the notion of “basic elements” was meant to reduce all the various chemical forms of matter to composi​tions of these elements without evoking a reduction of prin​ciples. In fact its introduction required adding basic principles concerning atomic structure. But the capacity of deriving Kepler’s laws, the law of a falling body, and the laws of tides from Newton’s laws of motion was due to the introduc​tion of a concept of a universal gravita​tional force acting between heavy bodies.
Using this distinction, we can discover a better possibility for seeing how understanding rises from unification. The conceptual integration is expected to produce a change in the ontological commitments of the specific domain from a richer and more diverse ontology of the previously prevailing system to one which is more parsimonious and homogeneous. The laws of the heavens were different from those on the Earth. So the understanding comes with the realization that a great number of seemingly different and unconnected phenomena can be accounted for in terms of general principles involving only a few number of entities. A realist, of course, does not put strong conditions on what kind of ontological commitments he believes the terms of a theoretical system require of him. In contrast, the anti-realist can only accept these commitments to the extent that the referent of those basic terms can be estab​lished indepen​dently of those phenomena they are proposed to explain. The difference between the realist and the anti-realist is also marked by the kind of ontologi​cal commit​ments they believe follow from the acceptance of laws and fundamental principles.​ Thus, I submit that unifica​tion as an integra​tion of both princi​ples and concepts yields theoreti​cal under​standing in the sense that it provides us with the explicit rules for how to use a uniform descrip​tive language to cover many different phenomena. 
Such a theoreti​cal insight into the formative concepts and constitutive principles of science is but one part of the understand​ing upon which science prevails, for unification of theories is far from the only aim of science. We have noticed several times that scientists may appeal to alternative models in seeking the best explanation of a certain phenomenon and that the choice of any particular model depends on the exigency and the interests of the scientists who experience the exigency. These conflicting models cannot be unified into one single scheme and the purpose of using mutually exclusive models is exactly because in science we also prefer the best, i.e. the most accurate and precise explanation, rather than an explanation which is less accurate and less precise, but which can be covered by a unifying principle. Therefore understanding in terms of models cannot be unified through unification because such an understanding depends on the context which determines the particular model we use in a certain situation.
 Moreover, also at the higher levels of theory construction, understanding does not necessarily come from unification under a common set of principles. There are different types of unification, bottom-up or top-down, and which one you prefer depends on your cognitive interests. Long ago Einstein made some remarks in which he distinguished between constructive theories and principle-theories. Constructive theories “build up a picture of the more complex phenomena out of materials of a relatively simple formal scheme from which they start out,” whereas principle-theories starts out from “not hypothetically constructed but empirically discovered ones, general characteristics of natural processes, principles that give rise to mathematically formulated criteria which the separate processes or the theoretical representations of them have to satisfy” (Einstein 1954, p. 228). The cognitive values which characterize the constructive approach are “completeness”, “adaptability”, and “clearness” while the values of the principle approach are “logical perfection” and “security of the foundations”.  So theory-building may either take its departure from basic constituents and processes of nature or it may start out by postulating certain principles which have an empirical origin. 
Unsurprisingly, Einstein saw the theory of relativity as a result of the latter view insofar as it had proven empirically impossible to find evidence in favour of theoretical asymmetries in electrodynamics or for the expected variation in the velocity of light with respect to the ether (Einstein 1905/1923, p. 37). These negative experiments gave Einstein the insight to formulate his two basic principles of special relativity, namely that the laws of nature are invariant with respect to all inertial frames and that the velocity of light in vacuum is the same in relation to all inertial frames. In contrast to his approach in special relativity, Einstein categorized the kinetic theory of gases as a constructive theory. Also the Bohr-Sommerfeld core model of atomic structure and Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics might be said to belong to the former category. But the picture here is much more mixed. 
Bohr began his program with two postulates: The quantization condition claims that electrons move around the nucleus in stationary states in which the energy is well-defined, and the frequency condition states that an electron jumping from one state to another emits radiation that corresponds to the energy difference between two stationary states. These postulates seem neither to be a result of empirical discoveries nor were they consistent with well confirmed principle of electrodynamics. One may, however, argue otherwise because the discovery of Planck’s constant was definitely the empirical imperative factor in Bohr’s thinking, and he often made a comparison between the epistemological lessons we could draw from relativity theory and quantum mechanics. In support thereof one could point to Michael Friedman’s idea of relativized a priori principles (Friedman 2001). This idea follows up on Hans Reichenbach’s expansion of the Kantian notion of a priori. Such relativized a priori principles are constitutive for a scientific framework. Although accepted a priori, they do have empirical content, but they cannot be empirically true or false because they cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed within the framework of which they are constitutive. Their empirical content stems from a time when they had the status of expressing an empirical discovery before they were elevated to the new status of constitutive for a framework. This seems to be the case with respect to the light principle, the principle of equivalence, and the principle that interactions involve a quantized exchange of action.
Theoretical constructions of Bohr’s theory were set up in a determined attempt to understand an immense amount of spectroscopic data. Certain Aufbau-principles helped the physicists to explain the periodic table in terms of the structure of the various elements and their internal relationship to one another. Furthermore, the kinematical behaviour of the interactions of atoms and radiation were explained by Bohr’s frequency law and – when this law was proven insufficient for understanding the emission spectra of elements other than the hydrogen – by Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics. Both Bohr and Heisenberg have several times claimed that matrix mechanics, which involves only observable quantities, was established with the intension of obeying the Bohr’s correspondence rule, his methodological requirement on theory-building in atomic physics. In his Faraday Lectures from 1932, for instance, Bohr emphasizes: “A fundamental step towards the establishing of a proper quantum mechanics was taken in 1925 by Heisenberg who showed how to replace the ordinary kinematical concepts, in the spirit of the corres​pondence argument, by symbols referring to the elementary processes and the probability of their occurrence” (Bohr 1998, p. 48, p. 96). The correspondence principle holds that a transition between stationary states is allowed if and only if there is a corresponding harmonic component in the classical motion. Nonetheless, the replacement of the ordinary kinematical concepts gave the new quantum mechanics a much more constructive basis than the original core model.
Now, if we take Einstein’s statement concerning the virtues of bottom-up or top-down explanation, you would imagine that it is a purely contingent matter which of them you follow, depending on which of the virtues that attract you most as a scientist. An interesting study has been made by Dennis Dieks showing that in spite of the fact that the special theory of relativity is considered as a top-down account of the famous length contractions and the time dilations, since these two effects are deducible from Einstein’s two principles, they can also be understood in terms of a constructive, bottom-up account. In this one starts with atoms and forces following the same approach as H.A. Lorentz did when he explained the null result of the Michelson-Morley experiment. As Dieks says: 

This does deny that the top-down derivations that have become standard in the literature also possess explanatory value and lead one to understand why these effects must exist according to relativity theory. The choice between these different explanatory strategies has a pragmatic character and depends on contextual factors. There is no clear-cut and general difference between the two types of explanation with regard to their power to generate understanding, because the notion of understanding is contextual in the same way explanation is (Dieks 2009, p. 233).

After Dieks has convincingly argued his case, he concludes that “there is no best way of explaining the relativistic effects.” It is the scientist’s interest which drives whether she prefers a top-down schema of explanation or a bottom-up schema as the best approach to understand them. Hence, explanation and understanding are relative to the questions we ask and the interest we have. I cannot agree more.
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^1	  For a similar view see de Regt and Dieks (2005)
^2	  In their seminal paper “Logic of Explanation”, Hempel and Oppenheim admit in note 33 that they have not been able to establish clear-cut relevance criteria for explaining regulari​ties in terms of more comprehensive regularities. The reason is that the purported explanation can be established as a conjunction of the law to be explained and any other law which is irrelevant for the explanation.
